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Chapter 13
13.1» Introduction
Until recently, social research neglected the phenomenon of political apathy 
among social classes that were hit most severely by the social and political 
consequences of the economic stagnation of the eighties. In a previous study, 
we attempted to fill this gap by addressing the issue (Van Snippenburg, 
Scheepers 1988; Scheepers, Van Snippenburg 1989). We formulated and tested 
a model to explain the political apathy among lower class people in the 
Netherlands during the mid-eighties. The results revealed that being a member 
of a deprived socioeconomic class increases the likelihood of developing autho­
ritarian and anomic attitudes. These attitudes in their turn promote political 
apathy. In addition, being a member of a deprived class also directly encourages 
political apathy.
In the present study we will try to elaborate and improve this apathy study, 
since it was inadequate to a certain extent A first flaw was that the deprived 
classes were only constituted by those in manual and routine non-manual labor. 
A more adequate operationalization of the deprived classes ought to include 
the inactives who are dependent on social security benefits (unemployed and 
invalidated people) as well. Second, the study did not differentiate between 
generations. This may be a flaw because it is to be expected that different 
generations will react differently to changing economic circumstances. Thus the 
generation that entered the labor-market for the first time in the thirties, 
during the period of the Great Depression, may have reacted very differently 
to the economic stagnation of the eighties from the generation that entered the
labor-market just before and during the economically expansive years of the 
late fifties and sixties.
In tliis study we will try to overcome these two shortcomings in the previous 
apathy study. We will include a class of benefit-dependents in the analysis, as 
well as a conceptually well elaborated working class/middle class distinction 
derived from Vanneman and Camion (1987). Furthermore, we will differentiate 
the explanatory model according to four generations discerned in a new gene­
rational classificatory scheme developed by Becker (1985, 1987)), In the next 
section we will present a description of the original apathy model of Van 
Snippenburg and Scheepers (1988). In the following section we will elaborate 
the three classes (benefit-dependents, working class, middle class) and their 
inclusion in the apathy model. Then we will present Becker’s classification of 
generations, while at the same time deliberating on the consequences it may 
have for the transformation of the general apathy model into four generation- 
specific apathy models. After having operationalized the main concepts, we will 
test the fourfold model by means of a LISREL multi-group analysis to see if 
it is indeed empirically meaningful to discern distinct models for the separate 
generations. Finally we will discuss the results and come to conclusions.
13.2, The apathy model
The theoretical model of Van Snippenburg and Scheepers is actually an 
elaboration of a combination of two classical hypotheses on the relation 
between class and political apathy, and one recently formulated conceptual 
model on relations between class, authoritarianism and anomie. The first of the 
two hypotheses stems from critics of the maixian thesis of "Verelendung" (Marx 
and Engels 1985/1848) which states that under (relatively) deteriorating 
socioeconomic and political conditions, for example as inequality increases or 
oppression of rulers becomes unbearable, the have-nots or the oppressed will 
turn to political revolt. The critics have emphasized that history has shown that 
political activity generally disappears under circumstances of deprivation. 
Instead, collective apathy often manifests itself among deprived groups (Jahoda, 
Lazersfeld and Zeisel 1933). In this way, the critics of the Verelendungs thesis 
have hypothesized that belonging to a deprived class has a direct positive 
(rather than negative) effect on political apathy. We will refer to this hypothe­
sis as the "simple materialistic thesis".
378 Chapter 13
Generation specific effects... 379
More elaborated arguments against the Verelendungs thesis were raised by 
members of the so-called "Frankfurter Schule", among others Fromm (1983/- 
1929,1936) and Adorno et al. (1982/1950). They bad observed that during the 
GTeat Depression of the thirties, the workers and have-nots in Germany, who 
had to bear the burden of the fast deteriorating economic situation, remained 
outside of the political scenery. Parts of the.middle class, on the other hand, 
actively engaged in politics, as did the cultural and economic elites (Kater 
1983). In the light of these facts, the Frankfurters criticized the mandan 
Verelendungs thesis. In their view, belonging to a deprived group promotes the 
development of an authoritarian personality. Such a personality usually has 
great respect for strong political leaders, to whom he is willing to submit 
himself unconditionally. He is characterized by rigid conformism to conventi­
onal norms, as well as by aggressive predispositions towards trespassers of these 
norms. A further characteristic of this personality is a cynical outlook on 
human afliairs (Fromm 1983/1929, Adorno et al. 1982/1950, Bonss 1983/1929). 
Authoritarian people are not ejected to oppose the existing state of political 
affairs, or to stand up against authorities. Conversely, they submit themselves 
to authorities, and remain aloof from the political field of force (Von Freyhold 
1971).
Taking into account the historical situation at the time of the formulation of 
this so-called "authoritarianism-thesis", Van Snippenburg and Scheepers assume 
that it also holds for the period of economic stagnation in the eighties. The 
circumstances were similar in several respects: as during the thirties, the lower 
classes again had to bear an uneven share of the burden of the economic 
stagnation, and had to face the harshest consequences of retrenchment policies.
A third foundation of this apathy model , of Snippenburg and Scheepers was 
derived from a theoretical model of Felling, Peters and Scheepers (1986), who 
had adjusted, and added some elements to, the authoritarianism-thesis of the 
Frankfurters. Felling at aL acknowledged that modem societies are ’achieving 
societies', in which achievement motivation and related traditional bourgeois 
values have high priority. People derive prestige and self-esteem from the reali­
zation of these values. Socioeconomic frustration and status-anxiety follow a 
lack of success, e.g. if people fail to reach the social status they aspire to. Even 
the threat of unemployment or of a reduction of salaries may have these conse­
quences. Felling et al. state that feelings of status-anxiety and socioeconomic 
frustration are especially strong within the deprived classes.
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According to Felling et al, socioeconomic frustration and status-anxiety are 
generally followed by two kinds of psychic reactions. First, they bring about the 
repression of spontaneous impulses which may subsequently lead to autho­
ritarianism (Fromm 1936). Second, they generate dissonance-reduction 
processes (Festinger 1957) which concern the psychic anticipations of the 
(threatening) discrepancy between aspirations and actual achievements. These 
dissonance-reduction processes are likely to result in an anomic mental state. 
Anomie is characterized by feelings of powerlessness, meaninglessness and 
social isolation. Both authoritarianism and anomie refer to social resignation, 
and lack of a willingness to stand up against authorities. This may eventually 
lead to political apathy. Felling et al, do not hypothesize a direct effect of class 
on authoritarianism and anomie. Their model is in this respect a denial of the 
authoritarianism thesis. They also deny a direct effect of dass on political apa­
thy, as was put forward by the simple materialistic thesis.They state that status- 
anxiety and socioeconomic frustration intermediate the relations between social 
class on the one hand and authoritarianism, anomie and political apathy on the 
other hand.
To summarize: taking as points of departure the simple materialistic thesis 
(derived from the critics of the Verelendungs-thesis), the authoritarianism-thesis 
of the Frankfurters, and the modifications of it by Felling et aL, Van Snip- 
penburg and Scheepers formulated an extended model to explain political 
apathy in the Netherlands during the eighties. Having tested this model with 
data of the Netherlands in 1985, they came to the following conclusive model 
(see figure 1, see also appendix 1).
Anomie and authoritarianism appeared to have significant direct effects on 
political apathy. The effect of the former is thereby far stronger than the effect 
of the latter. Both anomie and authoritarianism are influenced by feelings of 
status-anxiety and.socioeconomic frustration. The most salient direct effect on 
anomie and authoritarianism, as well as on political apathy, stems from social 
class. Thus, no argument could be found in the results to reject, as Felling et 
al. had done, the simple materialistic thesis of a direct link between social class 
on the one hand and attitudes (authoritarianism, anomie) and political behavior 
(apathy) on the other hand. The general conclusion of Van Snippenburg and 
Scheepers was that the economic stagnation, and the ensuing retrenchment 
policy of the Dutch government in the eighties, had far-reaching consequences 
for the subjective experience of socioeconomic, and political life, as well as for
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the political behavior of Dutch citizens; members of the (relatively) deprived 
occupational classes, mainly those in manual labor and routine white-collar 
employees, were inclined to turn their backs on politics. These classes were 
characterized by a higher level of political apathy.
Figure 1. Empirical model to explain political apathy , (standardized
coefficients).
.2123
133. Deprived classes
Van Snippenburg and Scheepers utilized a ten-category occupational classi­
fication of Erikson, Goldthorpe, and Portocarero (1983), adjusted by Gan­
zeboom et al. (1987) to the Dutch situation, as a class variable in their apathy 
model. They did not discern a category of unemployed and invalidated people, 
dependent on social security benefits, as a separate class (inactive class). This 
is an omission, since this class of inactives was also relatively deprived in the 
eighties. They were severely hit by the retrenchments in social security benefits 
and by the deteriorating conditions on the labor-market We decided to include 
this class of inactives in the present study.
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We also modified the class scheme in another way. Vanneman and Cannon
(1987), taking as a starting-point studies on the class division in modem 
societies of the political scientist Poulantzas (1974), suggest a new theoretically 
highly relevant and empirically fruitful class distinction that, in an slightly adap­
ted form, fits our research purpose well. This distinction diverges from the 
classical distinction between manual and non-manual labor (between blue-collar 
and white-collar workers) in that it draws the division on a somewhat higher 
level. Vanneman and Cannon argue that many white-collar workers, notably the 
routine white-collar workers (e,g. white-collar positions in clerical and retail sa­
les), have no control in their labor situation. They are dominated in the same 
way as blue-collar workers and actually belong, regarding this 
submittance/dominance dimension, to the same class as blue-collar workers. 
Manual workers and Iower-status employees are not only dominated by the 
managers and professionals in their own working organization (plant, shop, bu­
reau, etcetera), but also by those outside of that organization. The personnel 
officer, the engineer, the labor relations specialist, and even the firm’s doctor 
have a say in the how, if, and when of labor of others. They all have a stake 
in analyzing, designing, structuring, organizing and planning the labor of others, 
while members of the working class have not. In addition, all members of the 
working class see these managers, professionals, etcetera, as representatives of 
a dominant class. These arguments, as well as the supporting empirical findings 
of Vanneman and Cannon (see Vanneman and Cannon 1988: 53-110, for 
details), together with empirical findings of Van Snippenburg and Scheepers
(1988) -see for details section 13.5, persuaded us to make a distinction between 
a class of workers that comprises unskilled- and skilled manual work as well 
as routine white-collar workers on the one hand and, on the other hand, a 
middle class that comprises the self-employed, higher employees, professionals, 
and managers.
Consequently, we introduce to our model a class variable with three categories: 
middle class (e.g. professionals, managers, self-employed), working class (with 
the inclusion of routine white-collar workers, e.g. lower employees in clerical 
and retail sales), and the class of inactives.
13.4. Generations
In the previous study on political apathy, the research population was assumed 
to be homogeneous regarding different (socio-)historical generations and age-
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groups1. This may be a flaw, since it is to be expected that the deprived 
classes of different generations did not react in exactly the same way to the 
deteriorating socioeconomic circumstances of the eighties. An example of such 
a difference in reaction has already been mentioned in the introduction. In this 
study we will specificy the explanatory model separately for the four gene­
rations that, according to Becker (1985,1987), are ideal-typically to be discer­
ned within the Dutch population in the eighties, Becker labelled these genera­
tions as follows: 1) the pre-war generation, bom between 1910 and 1930,2) the 
silent generation, bom between 1930 and 1940,3) the protest-generation, bom 
between 1940 and 1955, and 4) the lost generation, bom after 1955, These 
dates should be considered as gross approximations of generation boundaries.
Becker took Mannheim’s famous essay on the problem of generations 
(1972/1928) as a frame of reference for his quadruple classification. Mannheim 
defines generations as configurations o f’formative’ cohorts which are specifical­
ly moulded by their simultaneous experience of critical sodohistorical events. 
The word ’formative’ means that the cohort members experienced these critical 
events during the formative years of their life cycle, which are assumed to 
extend over the late-adolescent and post-adolescent years (nowadays from about 
15 to 25 years of age). People are supposed to be very sensitive to critical sod-« 
oeconomic and political events (e.g. economic depression, or war) during that 
age-period, in which the transition from childhood to adulthood takes place 
and definite preparations for the first entry into the labor-market are made. 
During the formative years, people broaden their socioeconomic and political 
horizon to a considerable extent These years are of crudal importance to the 
formation of foundations on which, and thus for the ways in which, people 
generate attitudes and opinions in the fields of labor, politics, sodal justice, 
and so on, in later life. So, we may expect that to the extent that generations 
have undergone their formative experienced in different sodohistorical contexts, 
they will differ in the way their attitudes and their opinions are generated.
Characteristics of the four generations discerned by Becker, and the critical 
sodohistorical events that led to their emergence can be summarized as 
. follows.
For the pre-war generation, those bom between 1910 and 1930, the first 
pervasive collective experience was the economic crisis of the thirties (Becker 
1987:10). On entering the labor-market, a scarcity of jobs and low salaries 
awaited the members of this generation, of whom only a few had had a
secondary education. Often unemployment, poverty, and the dole were their 
share. Criticism of the bad labor conditions was avoided because those who had 
a job could so easily lose it  Society as a whole was not really permissive, 
authority was both strong and respected at that time. During the fifties, 
members of the pre-war generation had to bear the heaviest burden of the 
socioeconomic reconstruction following World War n. However, they eventually 
reached satisfactory levels of affluence once the reconstruction had been 
completed. When at the end of the sixties a generation emerged that 
challenged established authority, and materialistic and bourgeois values, it 
especially shook the convictions of the pre-war generation. Their experiences 
of scarcity in the thirties and forties had ingrained in them an industrious spirit 
and high levels of achievement motivation, They considered law and order, and 
economic progress necessary in order to avoid social chaos and security risks,
For the silent generation, bom in the thirties, the socio-economic recon­
struction after World War n  constituted a highly significant formative ex­
perience. Recovery from war damage, improvement of the educational system - 
although academic studies still remained largely the prerogative of higher 
socioeconomic classes, and an expanding labor-market were characteristic of the 
period of their transition to the adult world Members of this generation had 
also undergone experiences of scarcity and crisis, during World War n and in 
the early post-war period. However, their entry on the labor-market was for 
more favorable than that of the previous generation. like the pre-war genera­
tion, this generation was brought up to hold conventional norms. They were 
socialized in a cultural climate of high esteem for traditional bourgeois values,
i.e. for family-life, career achievement, and law and order.
The protest-generation. The cohorts bom between about 1940 and 1955 did not 
experience the hardships of the Great Depression and World War II. On the 
contrary, they knew only affluence and lasting peace during their formative 
years. The growing demand for well educated and trained employees, the 
increasing prosperity, as well as the post-war 'baby-boom* caused the educa­
tional system to expand rapidly. Schools turned into massive, impersonal 
institutions that no longer seemed to fit the needs of students of the time. The 
young of the sixties and early seventies, who took this newly acquired economic 
affluence for granted, began to attack the dominant bourgeois values. They 
rejected the meritocratic orientations that were so characteristic for previous
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generations. Tiiey had other priorities, like redistribution of wealth, sharing of 
political power, and the abolition of racial and gender discrimination,
The labor-market still offered reasonable job opportunities for those entering 
it for the first time« The period of expanding career prospects, however, seemed 
to have waned by the end of the sixties. Naturally, there was some frustration 
at these first (mild) obstructions to the rising occupational expectations of 
young adults. This may have been one of the catalysts of the wide-spread sup­
port for youth protest of that time (Van Snippenburg 1988).
The lost generation. Becker attaches the term 'lost* to the generation bom 
after about 1955. Its members came into first contact with society at large, and 
had their basic formative experiences within the wider social and political 
sphere in the seventies and eighties. They witnessed mainly a socioeconomic 
climate of stagnation, a political right-wing backlash, as well as ’no-nonsense’ 
policies and heavy retrenchment measures. Despite of their generally high 
educational levels, they could hope for at best only moderate career prospects. 
They had to face the risk of long-term unemployment, low wages at the start 
of their career, and often only part-time or temporary appointments. Their 
situation was in several respects similar to that at the time the pre-war genera­
tion entered the labor-market and had to face the ruptures of the Great De­
pression and the socioeconomic consequences of World War H. Because of the 
bad socioeconomic conditions, prosperity could no longer be taken for granted 
by members of the lost generation. As a consequence, materialistic values and 
achievement motivation regained some cultural dominance among them. An 
industrious spirit and high achievement motivation are again characteristic for 
this generation. Its members generally consider economic progress and some 
law and order necessary to avoid social chaos, and even authority is once again 
respected.
We have so far presented a brief description of Becker’s generations, and added 
some minor interpretations of our own. Substantial differences between the 
four generations that may bear upon the apathy model are the following.
- Traditional achievement values acquired higher priority in the pre-war, silent 
and lost generations than in the protest-generation. Members of this latter 
generation therefore derive prestige and self-esteem from the realization of 
these values to a lesser extent than members of the other generations. If, for 
instance, they fail to climb the socioeconomic ladder or are threatened by
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unemployment, reduction of salaries, and so on, they are less likely to suffer 
from status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration. -As a consequence, we expect 
the differences in levels of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration between 
the inactive and working class on the one hand, and the middle class on the 
other hand, to he smaller in the protest-generation than in the other generati­
ons during the recent period of socioeconomic stagnation in  the eighties.
- Members of the protest-generation experienced material affluence and a 
permissive society during their formative years. As a consequence, we believe 
them to be less inclined to repress spontaneous impulses, even under condi­
tions of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration. We therefore expea the 
effects of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration on authoritarianism to 
be relatively weak in this generation. We also assume these relations to be 
relatively weak in the prewar and silent generation, but for vastly different 
reasons. Members of these two generations directly experienced the ferocious 
consequences of nazism and the authoritarianism on which it was constituted. 
We expect this experience to hinder the development of authoritarian attitudes 
among them in later life. In other words, even if they feel status-anxious and 
socioeconomically frustrated, the transformation of these mental states into 
authoritarianism will be tempered as a consequence of their earlier frightful 
experiences. Members of the lost generation, however, lack these experiences. 
We therefore expect status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration to be more 
easily translated into authoritarianism among that group. This may be one of 
the reasons why fascism and racism could emerge during the eighties among 
minorities of young people in the Netherlands.
- A main formative event for members of the silent generation was the 
socioeconomic and political post-war reconstruction. The modem welfare state 
emerged early in their occupational careers. They witnessed the success of well 
directed policy efforts, and therefore acquired a belief in the possibility to 
structure and change society. The protest-generation, socialized in such a 
constructive and optimistic climate, took for granted the manageability of the 
political and economic structure. The affluence and the permissiveness they 
experienced in their formative years even made them prone to overestimate the 
chances of structure society, leading to the wide-spread youth protest at the 
end of the sixties and first half of the seventies. These formative experiences 
preclude members of the silent and the protest-generation from allowing 
feelings of anomie (powerlessness, senselessness and social isolation) to descend 
upon them, even when they are status-anadous or socioeconomically frustrated. 
The pre-war and lost generations» however, had their formative experiences at
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a time of worsening socioeconomic conditions, in times when society seemed 
far less manageable, and when a political ideology of retreat from interference 
in societal matters dominated. Consequently, they may be more prone to 
feelings of anomie under conditions of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frus­
tration. We therefore expect the effects of status-anxiety and socioeconomic 
frustration on anomie to be weaker in the silent and the protest-generation 
than in the pre-war and the lost generation.
- As we have already stated in the previous part of this section, the silent and 
the protest-generation had positive experiences of policy-efforts, and believed 
in the possibility of restructuring society. It was therefore less likely that they 
would fall subject to resignation processes and become politically apathetic as 
a consequence of authoritarian, and anomic attitudes, than the pre-war and the 
lost generation, which lacked these positive experiences. Of the pre-war and 
lost generation we actually expect the pre-war generation to be still more liable 
to resignation processes, since members of that group received for less educati­
on on average, and had their formative experiences in a less participatory cultu­
ral climate. To conclude, we expect the effects of authoritarianism and anomie 
on political apathy to be stronger in the lost generation than in the silent and 
protest-generation, and we expect these relations to be even stronger in the 
pre-war generation.
In summary. Arguments derived from Becker's ideal-typical generation model 
led us to the formulation of the foUowing four generation-specific hypotheses 
applicable to the Dutch population during the economic stagnation of the 
eighties:
1. The differences in levels of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration 
between the inactive and the working class on the one hand, and the 
middle class on the other hand, are smaller in the protest-generation than 
in the other three generations.
2. The effects of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration on autho­
ritarianism are stronger in the lost generation than in the other three 
generations.
3. The effects of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration on anomie are 
weaker in the silent and the protest-generation than in the pre-war and 
the lost generation.
4. The effects of authoritarianism and anomie on political apathy are 
stronger in the lost generation than in the silent and in the protest- 
generation. They are even stronger in the pre-war generation.
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We could not derive suggestions about differences between the generations in 
the direct effects of class on authoritarianism, anomie, and political apathy 
from the theories underlying the apathy model or from Becker’s generation- 
thesis. With regard to these effects we therefore stick tentatively to the results 
from the analyses of the apathy model for the whole population in the 
previous study. We will however, check to what extent the present analyses, 
with the changed definition and operationalization of social class as well as the 
generation-specific models, lead to comparable conclusions. We therefore 
formulate the following two non-generation-specific hypotheses as guidance for 
our research:
5. Belonging to a deprived class (inactive or working class) leads directly to 
authoritarianism and anomie.
6. Belonging to a deprived class leads directly to political apathy.
13.5. Data and method 
Sample
in 1985, a two-stage random sample of Dutch residents was taken. First, the 
Netherlands was divided into four regional zones: North, East, South and West 
Within these zones, municipalities were sampled in proportion to national 
distributions of urbanization. Second, respondents (18 to 69 years of age) were 
selected randomly out of these municipalities. The distributions of sample-res- 
pondents with respect to sex, age, marital status, as well as the combination of 
these characteristics, appeared to be an optimal approximation of known 
national distributions (Felling et al. 1987:9-10). We consider the sample repre­
sentative of the Dutch population.
Of this sample (N«1799), we selected the respondents who actually worked in 
1985, part time or full time, as well as those who were unemployed or 
(partially) disabled (dependent on social security benefits). Housewives, 
students, and the retired were excluded. Respondents were deleted listwise for 
all variables in the apathy modeL In this way we reached 1004 units for the 
analyses.
Measurements
For the operationalization of class we utilized a classification of occupations 
designed by Erikson, Goldthorpe and Portocarero (1983) for international 
comparative research. It was adjusted to the Dutch occupational coding system 
(as coded by the Dutch Office for Statistics, CB.S.) by Ganzeboom et al
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(1987). The original classification contains ten. nominal categories. We 
re-classified these categories into two distinct classes according to a criterion 
formulated by Vanneman and Cannon (1987): whether or not one is involved 
in occupational tasks regarding the organization, planning, and designing of 
labor (see section 13.3). Routine non-manual workers, skilled manual workers, 
semi- and unskilled manual workers, and agricultural workers were considered 
to constitute the working class, and managers, supervisors, professionals, the 
self-employed small proprietors, formers, smallholders and fishermen to 
constitute the middle class. Next to the theoretical and empirical arguments put 
forward by Vanneman and Cannon in favor of this distinction (see section 
13.3), we can add some research findings indicative of its empirical usefulness. 
Results of previous analyses of the general apathy model (see appendix 1), on 
which we actually elaborate in the present study, show that little information 
will be lost if we reduce the elaborate class scheme. The categories which 
constitute our so-called ’middle class' are relatively homogeneous with respect 
to their effects on both intervening and dependent variables In the model; the 
same is true for the categories which constitute the Nvorldng class*.
In order to operationalize the inactive class, we grouped the unemployed and 
the disabled in a third category. So, we finished with a threefold objective class 
variable: the inactive class, the working class, and the middle class.
We operationalized status-anxiety according to a scale construction of Felling 
et al. (1987). The scale refers to feelings of uncertainty regarding one’s future 
economic position and social prestige. We asked respondents whether they 
worried about a possible declining status of their neighbourhood, a cut in their 
household budgets, diminishing luxury for their family, and'a drastic change of 
their contemporary lifestyle. The six items by which these feelings were measu­
red, were converted into a scale by probabilistic scalogtamanalysis (Mokken 
1970). Its reliability (rho) is .76. Its scalability amounts to .39.
The operationalization of sodo-economic frustration was also derived from 
Felling et aL (1987). It was measured by two questions as to whether respon­
dents had recently experienced a finandal decline and whether they were (dis-) 
satisfied with their present finandal situation. Although the reliability of this 
scale is rather low (Cronbach’s alpha*=*51), we decided to use it because of the 
lack of other valid measures.
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The operationalization of authoritarianism covers the following nine subsyn- 
dromes conceptualized by Adorno et al. (1982/1950): authoritarian submission, 
authoritarian aggression, conventionalism, concern about sexual matters* 
projectivity, power and toughness, cynicism and destructiveness, stereotypy, and 
anti-intraception, Felling et al. (1987) selected an item for each of these sub­
syndromes, For example, items such as Vhat this country needs most, more 
than laws and political programs, is a few courageous, fearless, devoted leaders 
in whom people can put their faith", and "a person who has bad manners, 
habits and breeding, can hardly expect to get along with decent people", were 
submitted to the respondents. A scale was constructed via principal factor 
analysis (PA2 from SPSSx; Nie 1983). The reliability of the scale is ,78 (Cron- 
bach’s alpha).
Anomie was operationalized in accordance with the definition given by Srole 
(1956), referring to feelings of poweriessness, meaninglessness, general social 
decline, and social isolation. Felling et al. (1987) selected six items to cover 
these feelings. The respondents were asked to what extent they agreed or 
disagreed with statements like "In spite of what people say, average man’s 
situation is getting worse, not better", and "these days, a person does not really 
know whom he can count on”. Scales were constructed via principal factor 
analysis (PA2 from SPSSx; Nie 1983). The reliability (Cronbach's alpha) of this 
scale is .76
Political apathy was measured by items that refer to abstention from political 
participation. Respondents were asked how they had voted at the last national 
election, if they were members of a political party, active for a political party, 
discussed politics, tried to convince friends to vote for their party, cooperated 
with members of the community to solve local problems, attended political 
meetings, and contacted political officials. People who performed none, or only 
a few of such political activities, were considered to be politically apathetic. We 
constructed this scale by means of probabilistic scalogramanalysis. Its scalability 
is .49 and its reliability .75.
Analysis
We utilize path-analysis (multiple regression, ordinary least squares solution) 
to estimate the direct effects of our model, The following regression equations 
represent ail recursive relations specified in the present study to explain 
political apathy.
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X4 = a4 + b4 iD} + 4^2^ 2 + 4^3^ 2 + 4^.4X3 + e4 
X5 = B5,4* b^Dj + 5^.2^ 2 5^3^ 2 5^.4^ 3 "^” ®5 
X6 = ae + b61Dj + b(52E)2 + b63^2 *  ^4X3 + 6^.5^ 4 + 6^.6^5 + e6
where:
D1 «  working class X5 =anomie
D2 = inactive class X6 —political apathy
X2 = status-anxiety ai «constant
X3 = socioeconomic =unstandardized re­
frustration gression coefficient
X4 = authoritarianism ei »residual
Class is a nominal variable, which is broken down into dummy-variables. The 
number of dummy-variables in the regression equation is equal to the number 
of categories of the original variable minus one. This one serves as a reference 
category, in-our case the middle class. The unstandardized regression coeffi­
cients of the dummy-variables represent how much the predicted score of the 
concerned class-category deviates from the predicted score of the reference 
category, controlling for other independent variables in the equation.
First, we tested whether the generation-specific models (i.e. models estimated 
separately for the four generations as specified in section 13.4) differed sig­
nificantly. This test was executed by means of the multi-sample option of 
LISREL (LISREL VI: JOreskog and SOrbom, 1981), We used the covariance 
matrices, which are presented in appendix % The null-hypothesis was that the 
total model (whole set of unstandardized regression coefficients of the apathy 
model) in each sub-sample, i.e. in each generation, is identical to that in other 
sub-samples, i.e. in other generations. This null-hypothesis could be rejected on 
the basis of conventional statistical criteria (Chi-square=717.03, df=54, 
p=0,00). This means that the model differs significantly across generations. 
Because this test is fairly rigorous, we do not yet know which singular effects 
differ substantially across generations.
13.6. Results
To detect the differences in singular direct effects between the generations, we 
estimated the coefficients of the regression equations presented above for the 
separate generations (SPSSx/REGRESSION, Nie 1983).
The results are presented in table 1.
Table 1. Estimated coefficients of the apathy models for the separate
generations.
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m D2 X2 X3 X4 X5 R*
X4 I -29.34 25.27 .14 .03 .09
n 41.10* 27.99 .12* .04 .07
m 35.92** 8.34 .12* .09 .07
IV 19.62 15.60 .15* .11 .06
X5 i -39.01 14.63 .31** .46** .34
n 45.31** 5Z54* .21** .24** .20
m 44.25** 11.57 .16** .19** .14
IV 36.69** 31.40 ,21** .20** .15
X6 i 83.89** 34.31 .04 .01 ,25* .15 .24
n 33.04* 49.02* .13 -.16 .14 .19* .18
in 46.67** 39.15* -.08 .00 .08 .22** *13
IV 31.77** 13.87 -.15* -.02 .22** .22** .18
* significant at .05 level
* significant at .01 level
legends:
I = pre-war generation
n »  silent generation
m «  protest-generation
IV «  lost generation.
D1 «  working class
D2 «  inactive class
X2 s= status-anxiety
X3 = socioeconomic frustration
X4 = authoritarianism
X5 = anomie
X6 «  political apathy
In our previous research on political apathy it was found that belonging to a 
deprived class leads directly to authoritarianism and anomie. First we will check 
if the present study, with the changed definition and operationalization of class, 
and the analyses for the separate generations, lead to comparable conclusions. 
We therefore begin our discussion proceeding from thé two non-generation- 
specific hypotheses (5 and 6) formulated at the end of section 13.4,
Hypothesis 5 predicts that belonging to a deprived class leads directly to 
authoritarianism and anomie, irrespective of one’s generation location. The 
umtandardized regression coefficients of the class dummies on authoritarianism 
and anomie (see table 1, below Dx and D2) represent the extent to which the 
working class and the inactive class differ from the middle class (reference cate- 
goiy) regarding authoritarianism and anomie, controlled for other independent 
variables in the equations. It appears that the working class and the inactive 
class are generally more authoritarian than the middle class, and that the wor­
king class is generally more authoritarian than the inactive class. The pre-war 
generation is an exception. Its working class is less authoritarian than the 
middle class and the inactive class. The working class and the inactive class 
also appear to be generally more anomic than the middle class, except again 
in the pre-war generation where the working class is less anomic than the 
middle class (and the inactive class). The working class appears to be more 
anomic than the inactive class in the protest and the lost generation. We can 
conclude that the fifth hypothesis, which we derived from theories of the 
Frankfurters and Felling et al., is generally corroborated by the results. The 
working class in the pre-war generation is an exception; it is less authoritarian 
and less anomic than the middle class. .
Hypothesis 6 predicts that belonging to a deprived class leads directly to 
political apathy, irrespective of one’s generation location. The unstandardized 
regression coefficients of the working class and the inactive class on political 
apathy represent the extent to which political apathy in the working class and 
the inactive class respectively, deviate from political apathy in the middle class, 
controlled for other independent variables. It appears that both the working 
class and the inactive class in all generations are more politically apathetic than 
the middle class. In addition, the working class appears to be more apathetic 
than the inactive class in all generations, except in the silent generation. This 
means that the sixth hypothesis, which we derived from the simple materialistic 
model of the critics of the ’Verelendungs-thesis’, is generally corroborated by
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the results. In the final section we will discuss the remarkable funding that in 
most cases'the working class is more authoritarian and more politically 
apathetic than the inactive class (6 out of 8),
Table Z  Mean scores on status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration
of the classes in the distinct generations.
PRE-WAR GENERATION (N=86)
X2 X3
DO 424.47 514.36
D1 531.40 550.34
D2 545.32 588.28
SILENT GENERATION (N«173)
X2 X3
DO 486.32 493,84
D1 504.25 500.98
D2 553.69 615.25
PROTEST-GENERATION (N«471)
X2 X3
DO 485.45 483.88
D1 498.87 502.87
D2 554,43 608.17
LOST GENERATION (N=264)
X2 X3
DO 481.25 433.96
D1 496.31 457.27
D2 539.20 * 537.84
legends;
DO = middle class 
D1 = working class 
D2 =5 inactive class 
X2 =5 status-anxiety 
X3 a,socioeconomic frustration
Now we turn to the generation-specific hypotheses (1 to 4).
Generation specific effects... 395
Hypothesis 1 predicts that class differences in status-anxiety and socio-economic 
frustration between the middle class and the working class, as well as the class 
of inactives, are smaller in the protest-generation than in the other three 
generations. In order to test this hypothesis we compared the differences in 
mean scores on status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration of the classes in 
the distinct generations (see table 2 for these mean scores). .
The level of socioeconomic frustration and of status-anxiety is higher in eveiy 
generation of the working and the inactive class than in the middle class. This 
is in accordance with the notions of Felling et aL included in the apathy model 
(see section 13.2). The class differences in status-anxiety are largest within the 
pre-war generation, and those regarding socio-economic frustration are smallest 
within that generation. The class-differences in the other generations do not 
diverge substantially from each other. Our expectation that these class-diffe­
rences would be smallest within the protest-generation is therefore not corrobo­
rated. We made no predictions about the levels of socioeconomic frustration 
and status-anxiety in the distinct generations but, as the results show, the level 
of status-anxiety is remarkably lower in the middle class of the pre-war 
generation than in the middle class of the other generations. The level of 
socioeconomic frustration in all classes of the lost generation is lower than in 
comparable classes of the other generations. In the final section we will discuss 
these differences in levels between the generations.
Hypothesis 2 states that direct effects of status-anxiety and socioeconomic 
frustration on authoritarianism (repression processes) are strongest in the lost 
generation. The unstandardized regression coefficients representing the effect 
of status-anxiety on authoritarianism (see table 1) indicate that this effect is 
indeed strongest in the lost generation, but only to a small extent The effect 
of socio-economic frustration on authoritarianism is not significant in any 
generation. A comparison of this effect across the generations indicates that the 
differences point in the expected direction (strongest in the lost generation), 
but again not to a convincing extent. We may conclude that the overall results 
point in the expected direction, but that they are not decisive enough to reject 
the null-hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3 states that direct effects of status-anxiety and socioeconomic 
frustration on anomie (dissonance-reduction processes) are weaker in the silent 
and the protest-generation than in the pre-war and the lost generation. The 
unstandardized regression coefficients representing the effects of status-anxiety
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and socio-economic frustration on anomie (in table 1) indicate that these 
effects are, as expected, strongest in the pre-war generation (.31 and .46), But 
these effects are not really stronger in the lost generation than in the silent 
and the protest-generation. This means that our hypotheses on the dissonan- 
ce-reduction-effects is only corroborated for the pre-war generation.
Hypothesis 4 states that the effects of authoritarianism and anomie on political 
apathy'are stronger in the lost generation than in the silent and the protest- 
generation, and that they are even stronger in the pre-war generation. The 
unstandardized regression coefficients representing these.effects (in table 1) 
show that the effect of authoritarianism on political apathy is clearly strongest 
in the pre-war generation (.25), and second strongest in the lost generation 
(,22). These effects are not even significant within the silent-, and the protest- 
generation. The differences between the generations regarding the effects of 
anomie on political apathy are only small. Contrary to our expectations, it is 
weakest (not even significant) within the pre-war generation. This means that 
hypothesis 4 is corroborated only for the effect of authoritarianism on political 
apathy.
33.7. Discussion
The varied results presented in the preceding section are hard to summarize 
and discuss in a few sentences. We will nevertheless try to give an overview 
and present ex post-facto explanations for some of the most remarkable 
finding? - those that are contrary to our expectations, for example.
The effect parameters of the class dummy-variables indicate that, in accordance 
with the predictions, belonging to a deprived class generally leads directly to 
authoritarianism, anomie, and political apathy. Regarding this part of the re­
search, however, a major exception and another remarkable finding merit some 
further attention. Let us turn first to the remarkable finding. The inactive class 
appeared to be less politically apathetic and less authoritarian than the working 
class in three of the four generations. The pre-war generation being the excep­
tion with regard to authoritarianism, and the silent generation being the excep­
tion with regard to political apathy. Although we did not formulate hypotheses 
on differences in effects between the working class and the inactive class, and 
although the findings regarding these working class/inactive class differences 
only point in a certain direction - i.e are not consistent enough to be
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conclusive, they are unexpected. We could have anticipated findings indicating 
a difference in the opposite direction. For, we considered the inactive class to 
be still more deprived than the working class; the inactive class seemed to have 
been hit even more severely than the working class by the deteriorated soci­
oeconomic circumstances of the first half of the eighties. A theory of Kohn 
(1977,1981) may offer an interpretation. Kohn states that working class people 
usually have to obey orders, and to submit to authorities during their working 
hours, consequently becoming apathetic to their labor situation. Kohn states 
that they are inclined to stick to such attitudes beyond the labor situation. This 
might explain why working class people are, on average, more authoritarian and 
more politically apathetic than the inactives who, generally, do not have to 
obey orders daily.
Now we turn to the exception to the overall result that belonging to a deprived 
class leads to authoritarianism and anomie* The working class in the pre-war 
generation appeared to be less authoritarian and less anomic than the middle 
class. We do not have an adequate theoretical interpretation for this unex­
pected finding. The exception was possibly caused by the small number of 
respondents in the inactive class of the pre-war generation (only 37 
respondents).
Our expectation that, during the recent economic stagnation, the differences in 
levels of status-anxiety and socioeconomic frustration between the middle class 
and the deprived classes would be smallest in the protest-generation - because 
members of this generation were supposed to be less achievement oriented (see 
section 13.4), is not in accordance with the results. Apparently, the decline in 
career opportunities, rising unemployment and the threat of a reduced income 
even infected this generation that was once known for its opposition to 
material affluence, and lack of achievement motivation.
The level of status-anxiety appeared to be lower in the middle class of the pre­
war generation than in the middle class of the other generations. Perhaps many 
of the middle class members of this oldest generation were hardly touched by 
the bad consequences of the socioeconomic stagnation of the eighties because, 
at that time, they had almost finished their occupational careers, reached 
optimal and permanent standards of living, and had rather secure financial 
prospects in the form of some acquired wealth and good pension rights. The 
level of socioeconomic frustration appeared to be lower hi all classes of the 
lost generation than in the comparable classes of the other generations. This
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may have been because most members of the lost generation had hardly started 
their occupational careers, They were accommodated to the deteriorated econo­
mic circumstances. They had never had favorable career and income prospects, 
so socioeconomic frustration could hardly affect them.
The results did not contradict the predictions of the hypotheses regarding the 
effects of status-amdety and socioeconomic frustration on authoritarianism and 
anomie, or of these latter two on political apathy. However, neither did they 
corroborate them clearly. The differences in effects between the generations 
pointed generally in the expected directions, but only to a moderate extent 
More definitive results may be obtained with data of larger samples,
The indedsiveness of the results did not come as a total surprise. For Becker's 
generation-thesis is formulated at a high level of abstraction. The research was 
further hindered by the small numbers of research-units available in some 
categories of the generation-specific analyses, particularly with regard to the 
pre-war generation. With a larger sample the results would perhaps have poin­
ted more decisively in certain directions. The presented tentative results and 
conclusions may nevertheless be of heuristic value for further generation-sped- 
fic model building with more concretely described generations and more 
extensive data-files.
NOTE
1. The concept sociohistorical generation refers to sodologically meaningful 
clusters of birth-cohorts, One remains a member of a generation throughout 
the life-span. This contrary to age-groups, of which one remains a member only 
as long as one is of a specific age.
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APPENDIX 1
Unstandardized regression coefficients of the original apathy model (N«1464)
X4 X5 X6
X2 4.3270 11.4467 -.5228
X3 7.1873 10.5176 -.3966
X4 .0148
X5 .0447
D1 -17.7680 -2.1130 2.7468
D2 10.1033 26.4456 8.0737
D3 92.9862 30.9141 -1.3814
D4 27.8924 22.6835 3.5512
D5 60.9551 25.7043 -2.2009
D6 63.1837 32.3020 3.1323
D7 26.0844 47.8818 9.2160
D8 53.5748 74.5695 9.6577
D9 24.6342 26.2913 5.0091
where:
X2 = status-anxiety
X3 *= socioeconomic frustration
X4 *= authoritarianism
X5 *= anomie
X6 = political apathy
D1 = lower grade professionals, managers in small business and industrial 
establishments, supervisors of non-manual employees, higher grade 
technicians
D2 «  routine white-collar employees, other rank-and-file service workers
D3 - small proprietors with employees
D4 = small proprietors without employees
D5 »  formers and smallholders, self-employed fishermen
D6 - lower grade technicians, supervisors of manual workers
D7 6= skilled manual workers
D8 - semi- and unskilled manual workers
D9 = agricultural workers
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APPENDDC2
Variances and covariances of the variables of the apathy model for the four 
générations
PRE-WAR GENERATION
D1 .22
D2 -.13 .24
X2 8,32 15.04 11728.81
X3 -1.52 13.02 4381.23 7442.68
X4 8.74 1233 1904.95 1195.21 9428.98
X5 -8.76 19.28 5580.60 5055.95 4570.68 13691.76
X6 11.11 4.09 3029.84 1643.75 2837.54 3469.45 10396.36
SILENT GENERATION
D1 .25
D2 -.07 .14
X2 -.23 7.96 11731.94
X3 -6.59 16.07 4243.21 9982.73
X4 7.84 2.70 1861.69 1151.50 10126.60
X5 5.89 9.53 3839.57 3801.88 4189.45 12040.16
X6 7.99 5.01 2198.26 378.15 2673.17 3383.50 9958.15
PROTEST-GENERATION
D1 .25
D2 -.04 .08
X2 .53 5.07 9552.16
X3 -.33 9.35 2924.76 9679.02
X4 8.62 .69 1464.00 1313.73 9090.33
X5 10.55 1.71 2156.80 2377.99 4748.59 8816.43
X6 12.02 1.47 16.21 754.68 2068.98 2696.07 10216.51
LOST GENERATION
D1 .25
D2 -.09 .13
X2 -1.26 66.19 9094.03
X3 -3.16 11.40 2341.58 8933.51
X4 2.97 2.49 1677.59 143537 8682.01
X5 5.47 4.46 2525.30 2497.31 4817.67 9271.80
X6 8.71 -.53 -436.86 423.86 2787.57 2865.43 8437.73
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legends:
D1 ss working class X4 »  authoritarianism 
D2 = inactive class X5 *= anomie 
X2 — status-axmety X6 = political apathy 
X3 = socioeconomic frustration
